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Abstract
This paper uses data from two waves of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS2-1997 and IFLS3-
2000) to investigate whether households that belong to the same extended families pool their income
to smooth their consumption. We exploit the fact that the survey also tracks and interviews split-off
households during the follow-up surveys, enabling us to construct a panel of extended families. The
findings suggest that in contradiction to the null hypothesis of extended-family income pooling,
household own income still matters to household consumption even after controlling for extended
family resources. The result stands after correcting for potential measurement error and endogeneity
of income. More importantly, the findings also suggest that although the change in household own
income matters to the change in household consumption, controlling for extended family resources,
the magnitudes of the coefficients are small. We also find evidence that household consumption is
affected by characteristics of other households in the same extended family.
Keywords: Consumption smoothing; Risk-sharing; Extended families;
JEL classification: D13, J12, O12
1 Introduction
Households break-up over time for several reasons such as members migrating to other villages or
cities to find jobs, adult children leaving to form new households, or marriage dissolution. However,
households with familial links may still have economic ties with each other. For instance, between
these households there may be transfers of income, exchanges of gifts, or informal loans provided
by one household to another. These inter-household transactions may be motivated by altruistic
feelings of the households in the extended families toward each other. Parents may transfer income to
their child’s household because they derive utility from their child’s consumption. But the transfers
may also be motivated by self-interest: parents may provide transfer to their child in anticipation for
receiving old age support from their child. In any case, one household’s resource allocation decision
may affect and be affected by allocation decisions of other households within the extended family.
While there have been many studies on intra-household allocations in developing countries,
there are still few studies focusing on the role that an extended family plays in a household’s
allocation decision. This paper focuses on this issue, and in particular asks whether or not extended
family provide a means for households to smooth their consumption.
In the absence of complete financial and insurance markets, households may be involved
in informal arrangements with each other in order to smooth their consumption.1 Previous stud-
ies on inter-household allocations as consumption smoothing mechanism have focused on various
links through which the mechanism works. Many studies on consumption smoothing focus on how
households in a geographic location insure themselves against consumption risk faced by the com-
munity. The seminal paper in this area by Townsend(1994), looking at households in southern
Indian villages, argues that households within a village can make informal arrangement using local
institutions to mitigate risks from uncertainty faced in an agricultural economy.2 But geographical
proximity may not be the only grounds the informal arrangement is based on. Households may also
be involved in inter-household allocation with relatives or members of the extended families living in
different villages or regions. Indeed, pooling resources with members of the extended family living
in different village may protect the household from village-specific economic shocks. Rosenzweig
and Stark (1989) study the practice in rural India of marrying daughters off to households living in
different geographic locations. They find evidence that the marriage cum migration patterns plays
a role in reducing household consumption variability. A study by Grimard (1997) on households
1There are of course mechanisms other than inter-household arrangement that a household can use to limit their
consumption risks in the absence of complete financial and insurance markets. For example, households may adjust
their labor supply, deplete their non-financial assets, or withdraw their children from school.
2See also Ravallion and Chauduri (1997) for a very closely related work using data from the same ICRISAT
villages.
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in Cote d’Ivoire focuses on consumption smoothing between households with the same ethnicity,
allowing for the possibility of risk-sharing among members of the same ethnicity who live in different
regions. The study shows some evidence of partial insurance performed by individual household
with the members of the same ethnic group living across different geographic locations. However,
the study can only identify the ethnic group, not the particular lineage that the households belong
to.
In different social settings, using ethnic group as the ”insurance group” may not be the
most appropriate. As noted by Townsend (1994), closer relationship such as family ties between
members of an extended family rather than ethnicity or geographical proximity may be a more
important factor on which households base their informal arrangement. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kot-
likoff (1992) investigate whether households within extended families in the United States smooth
their consumption. Using data from several waves of Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they reject
the null hypothesis of dynastic altruism among families in the sample. They find that at a point in
time, the distribution of consumption between parents and children is affected by the distribution
of their income. They also find that changes in distribution of income within extended family affect
changes in the distribution of consumption. Although they interpret the test as a test for extended
family altruism, the test is similar to that of inter-household risk-sharing.
It is worth noting that Altonji et al.(1992) are looking at extended families in the United
States. There are several reasons why focusing on households in developing countries might produce
different results. Households in developing countries face very different risk environment from their
counterpart in developed countries. Majority of the households depend on the agricultural sector,
where variability in income is high. As has already been mentioned above, the lack of social security
system and the absence of complete financial and insurance market may cause households in these
countries to rely on inter-household informal arrangements as a way to smooth their consumption.
It is therefore reasonable to believe that extended families may play a larger role than they do in
the developed countries.
However, focusing on extended families imposes a data requirement that is hard to meet by
most household surveys. This is especially true for household surveys from developing countries.
Many of the surveys do not purposely collect information on households that have familial links
with each other.
This paper takes advantage of an unusual feature of the Indonesia Family Life Survey,
namely the fact that this longitudinal household survey tracks a large fraction household members
who have moved out of their original households and re-interview them in their new households
(the split-off households) in the follow-up surveys. By identifying the household from which the
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members originated from, we can identify the households that have family ties and define elements
of the extended families.3
The approach used in this paper is based on that of Altonji et al. (1992). Using data
from two waves of the IFLS - IFLS2 (1997) and IFLS3 (2000)- we test whether households within
an extended family pool their income to smooth their consumption. These two waves include an
important period: Indonesia was hit by a financial crisis that started in 1997 and reached its peak
in mid-1998. How the crisis has affected the welfare of Indonesian households is an important and
interesting subject. This paper contribute towards our understanding the dynamics of household
behavior during a period of economic crisis.4
The findings show some evidence against complete risk-sharing within extended-families
among the IFLS households, both in 1997 and in 2000. To control for the potential measurement
error and endogeneity of income, the models are estimated using instrument variables to instrument
income. The distribution of income matters for the distribution of consumption within an extended
family even after controlling for extended-family fixed-effects. The first-difference version of the
model is estimated to control for possibility that household-specific fixed-effects that are correlated
with income. This test also helps to tell us whether households use inter-household transfer as
a consumption smoothing mechanism to cope with the financial and economic crisis during the
period. As in the static tests, we use instrumental variables estimation to correct for the potential
measurement error and endogeneity of income changes. The dynamic tests return estimates of
income coefficients that are statistically different from zero, even after controlling for extended-
family fixed-effects. However, the magnitudes of these income coefficients are small.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews some evidence on inter-
household transfers in Indonesia. The section also provides a brief background of the IFLS. The
composition of households that constitute the sample is also discussed in this section. Section three
3Note that throughout this paper, family formation and dissolution are assumed to be exogenous, as is common
in most of studies on household in developing countries. Understanding how household structure and composition
respond to economic incentives is one of the key question in economics of the household but it is beyond the scope of
this paper. See Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) for an example of a study that explicitly model household division in
the case of developing countries.
4This paper is also motivated by the question of how to take advantage of the longitudinal household surveys
that interview original as well as split-off households. Collecting information from the split-off households in addition
to the original households helps to reduce sample attrition, a problem that is faced by all longitudinal surveys.
However, defining what constitutes a household in a panel for the purpose of economic analysis then become a
question since analysis using panel households that consists of only the original households may be biased to the
extent that households break-up non-randomly. In addition, using a panel of original household is also problematic
because the rules used by surveys to define ”original” and ”split-off” households are often designed for ease in the
fieldwork rather than based on some analytical underpinnings. This, coupled with the concern that dropping split-off
households may non-randomly exclude particular subgroups of the sample, make the option of creating a panel of
original household unappealing. On the other hand, one could choose to define the panel by treating an original
household and its split-off households as a single extended family. This approach, however, implies that the extended
family acts as if it were a single household, or that household decisions are made at the extended family level.
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discusses the model used in the estimation. The variables used in the estimation including the
instrumental variables are discussed in section four. Section five discusses the estimation results,
and the paper is concluded in section six.
2 Background
2.1 Evidence on Inter-household Allocations in Indonesia
In the past years there have been numerous empirical studies that look at inter-household transfers
in both developed and developing countries. Altonji et al.(1997) use data from the PSID to look at
inter-generational transfers and test whether inter-vivos transfers from parents to child are motivated
by altruism. In another study, Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) tests whether there is complete
risk-sharing between and within the PSID families. They reject both inter- and intra-family full
risk-sharing. Other studies that examine distribution of resources within extended families look at
data on transfers explicitly. An example is the study by McGarry and Schoeni (1995) looking at
how transfers are distributed within extended families. Using data from the Health and Retirement
Survey they found that parents give more to their less well off children and elderly parents.
Empirically, there is evidence that inter-household transfers are an important source of in-
come for households in developing countries (Cox and Jimenez, 1990).5 While motives for transfers
could vary (e.g. altruism, self-interest motivated), evidence have shown that transfers narrow in-
equality and serve as social insurance (Cox and Jimenez, 1990). Lillard and Willis (1997) find
evidence that transfers from children to parents are an important source of old age support among
Malaysian families. More recently Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) incorporate altruism into a model
of risk sharing under imperfect commitment to study the inter-household transfers in rural India
and Pakistan.
Inter-household transfers are also important among Indonesian households.6 For example, a
study by Ravallion and Reardon (1988) using data from the 1981 National Socioeconomic Household
Survey (the SUSENAS) finds that around 25 percent of rural and 40 percent of urban households
in the province of Yogyakarta in Java are net recipients of transfers, and around 54 percent and
31 percent of households are net giver of transfers. They also find that that transfers are targeted
5The review by Cox and Jimenez (1990) of studies on transfers in developing countries reports the percentage of
households receiving transfers as well as the average transfer amount as percentage of average income. The numbers
are typically high. For example, 93 percent of households in rural South India receive transfers. Transfers account
for 46 percent of the average income of the Malaysian households in the lowest income quintile.
6The importance of the role of extended family in Indonesia in providing resources to its members has long been
discussed by anthropologists (see for example, Geertz (1961), and Jay (1967)). The extended family is expected to
assist not only the members who are facing a crisis, but sometime also in the human capital investment of family
members. For instance, if a family is unable to pay for the education of a promising child, the extended family is
expected to make sacrifices to help the family(Geertz, 1961).
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to disadvantaged households. Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2001) use data from IFLS1-1993 and find
that between 50 percent to 70 percent of elderly receive transfers. Focusing on old age support,
Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2001) find that transfers from children to parents are not strongly related
to parental need or ability of children to give to their parents. Using the same data but focusing
on married couples, Frankenberg, Lillard and Willis (2002) find that close to 44 percent of couples
transfer money to their non-coresident children and 55 percent of couples receive transfers from
adult children. While they find that there are differences in the extent of exchange as well as
motivations underlying inter-household transfers, but they also find substantial evidence supporting
the insurance motives. Levine and Kevane (2000) look specifically at transfers from parents to
daughters in Indonesia to see whether parents invest lest to daughters who move away after marriage.
Looking at schooling and health outcomes, they also find that there is no evidence that parents invest
less on daughters who move away after marriage. The study by Park (2003), using data from IFLS1-
1993, looks beyond the inter-generational transfers between parents and children. Determinants for
three types of transfers (parents to children, children to parents, and between siblings) are separately
estimated and the results suggest that different motives lie behind the different types of transfers.
The studies discussed above show that there is no single motive that can explain all inter-
household transfers in Indonesia. Regardless of the motives or the direction of transfers, it is evident
that inter-household transfers play a role in household allocations in Indonesia. This paper will not
be focusing on transfers directly.7 Instead, drawing on the evidence, the study looks at what happens
to household consumption, taking into account the inter-household ties. To the extent that inter-
household transfers help households to smooth their consumption, we examine whether extended
family pool their resources.
2.2 Indonesia Family Life Survey
The IFLS is a longitudinal household and community survey that collects a large amount of in-
formation from households that include information about their consumption, income, and assets.
It also collects data from each individual on fertility, education, health, as well as migration, and
labor market variables. In addition the survey also collects information about the community and
school and health facilities. The first wave of the sample was collected in 1993 and is representative
of about 83 percent of the Indonesian population living in 13 of the 27 provinces in the country.8
7We did look at the incidence of transfers among IFLS3 households. Individuals were asked about the amount
of transfers received from, and provided to, non-coresidence parents and children in the last 12 months . At the
household level, we find that around 43 percent of households reported to have received transfers from and 56 percent
have provided transfers to their parents or children. For the net recipients, the amount of transfers divided by 12 are
around 7 percent of household monthly expenditure. For the net givers, the number is around 3 percent.
8See Frankenberg and Karoly (1995) for full documentation of IFLS1.
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Since then there have been two other full sample follow-ups (IFLS2 in 1997, and IFLS3 in 2000)
and a follow-up of a 25 percent sub-sample in 1998 (IFLS2+). This paper focuses on consumption
and consumption changes between 1997 and 2000, using the data from IFLS2 and IFLS3.
Respondent moving from the original survey location is one of the main causes of sample
attrition in most household surveys. The IFLS is one of the very few surveys conducted in developing
countries that track its target respondents when they move.9 Tracking in the IFLS explain why the
survey has a very low attrition rate, even compared to surveys conducted in developed countries.
At the baseline in 1993, 7,224 households were interviewed. This number represents 93 percent of
the total original target sample of 7,330 households. The IFLS2, which was conducted in 1997 have
a re-contact rate of 93.4 percent (see Table 1) as 6,752 original households as well as 877 split-off
households were re-contacted.
The IFLS3 that was conducted in 2000 managed to re-contact 94.7 percent of the target
households which consists of all of the original 1993 households plus households that split-off in 1997
and 1998. Some of the households that were not found in 1997 (IFLS2) and 1998 (IFLS2+) were
found and re-interviewed in 2000. In addition, 2,645 new 2000 split-off households were contacted
in 2000.
2.3 Household Structure and Characteristics
This section discusses the structure and the characteristics of the households that constitute the
sample. Who are the split-offs and how are their households different from the old households?
This information is essential because it may tell us whether or not the test of income pooling within
an extended family is plausible. In particular, it is important to know how big the fraction of the
extended families actually represents inter-generational (i.e., parent-child relationships) linkages.
Another concern is that a lot of the households that split might have done so as a result of divorce
or marital separation (although again, this paper treats household break-up as exogenous). In this
case, altruistic linkage between households may not be plausible.
We define an extended family as the set of households originating from the same 1993
households.10 A target household is a household that was interviewed in any prior wave of the
survey. A split-off household consists of an individual or group of individuals who moved out from
the original households to form a new household.
In 1997, the target households were the 1993 original households. Thus in 1997, an extended
9See Frankenberg and Thomas (2000) for full documentation of IFLS2.
10It is important to note that it is never possible to observe a ”complete” extended family in the sample. In most
of the cases, the households identified as extended family in the sample will only include the household of the parents
and their children’s households. Pooling of resources - if it occurs at all- may involve the larger extended family,
many of whom are not survey respondents (for example, the household of the child’s in-laws).
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family with multiple households will include a target household and at least a split-off household.
In 2000, the target households include the 1993 original households, the 1997 split-off households,
and the 1998 split-off households.
Table 2 shows the number of households and extended families interviewed in IFLS1, IFLS2
and IFLS3. The number of households that were interviewed in 1993 is 7,224. In the follow-up
surveys in 1997, a total number of 7,619 households were re-interviewed. This number includes
both 1993 origin households as well as the households that split-off by 1997. The number of origin
households interviewed in 1997 was actually 6,742 (93.3 percent of 1993 households). The other 877
households were split-off households spawned from 791 original households. In 2000, the number of
households interviewed was 10,435, which came from 6,774 extended families (93.8 percent of 1993
households). Out of the 10,435 households interviewed, 7,790 were target households and 2,645 were
new 2000 split-off households.
The rule used to assign which households are original and which are split-off households
turns out to be somewhat arbitrary. At the first point of field contact with any 1993 household
member, the household where the individual was found was assigned to be the original household
(see Frankenberg and Thomas, 2000). In practice, this will be the household living at the same
address as the previous wave. This ”first-contact” rule has the advantage of ensuring at least some
information of all target household members was gathered, and it also minimizes the risk of losing
information of the whereabouts of other 1993 household members. However, the rule also results in
a great deal of arbitrariness. For instance, in some cases, a household defined as a split-off household
may retain more members as well as household characteristics of the original household than the
one assigned as ”original” household according to the rule. (see Witoelar (2004) for more discussion
on this issue). The question that arises when one wants to restrict the analysis on only the panel
of the original households is: are the ’correct’ households being chosen?
While analysis using only the panel of original households may suffer from the fact that
those households may not be the ”same” households, a potentially more serious problem come from
the fact that split-off households may have very different characteristics than the target households.
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of some of the economic and demographic variables of the
2000 target and 2000 new split-off households. Income and expenditure of the main households
are higher than those of split-off households. Household size of the split-off households tends to be
smaller. Per capita expenditure, which is very common measure of welfare, is higher for the split-off
households than the target households. The same is true for per capita income. The proportions of
adult members aged 15-59 years are very similar in each group, however the proportion of elderly is
higher in the main households. On average, the heads of the split-off households are younger, better
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educated. The maximum years of education of adult is also higher in the split-off households. The
proportion of split-off household residing in urban areas is higher. In short, the split-off households
have different characteristics from the target households, suggesting that household break-up non-
random. Analysis excluding the split-off households will suffer from selection bias.
How many of the split-off households are really formed by children leaving their parents’
household? Table 5 shows the number of extended families with multiple households as well as
parent-child extended families. A parent-child extended family is defined as an extended family in
which there are at least one parent-child relationship between individuals in the different house-
holds.11 In 1997, there are 791 extended families with multiple households, of which 653 were
parent-child extended families (82 percent). By 2000, there are 2,610 extended families with mul-
tiple households. Around 83 percent of them (2,176 extended families) are parent-child extended
families.12
If a household split as a result of marriage dissolution, one may question whether it is still
plausible to think that the households have any altruistic linkage. For cases of divorce where no
children are present, altruistic behavior between the households may indeed seem to be unrealistic.
On the other hand, with the presence of children, the divorced parents may still pool resources in
order to improve their children’s welfare. If this is the case, some pooling of resources can still be
observed although it might not necessarily be motivated by altruism.13
Table 6 shows the current marital status of the head of households in 2000 in the target
households and the new split-off households. About 2 percent of head of the households in the split-
off households were either divorced or separated. The percentages among the target households
were slightly higher (2.9 percent).14 The low percentage of the heads of split-off households that
were divorced or separated help to support the case that marital break-ups do not seem to play a
major role in the spawning of new split-off households in the data. However, it is important to note
11By this definition it is possible that a household can have someone identified as ”parent” and ”child. In fact in
some cases, one individual is both a parent and a child.
12Using the similar approach we also define samples of parent-son extended families and parent-daughter extended
families to see whether there are differences between these two samples. A parent-son (daughter) extended family is
an extended family in which there is at least one parent-son (daughter) relationship between individuals in different
households. This is of interest since parents may behave differently towards their son’s household and their daughter’s
household due to factors such as local norms, traditions, and other social institutions. For example, transfer behavior
may depend on where the adult children reside after marriage.
13In reality, parents with no custodial rights over the children often make inadequate transfers to the ones with
custody. To explain this, Weiss and Willis (1985) modeled children as collective consumption goods within marriage,
and they argued that altruism within marriage serves to overcome the ”free-rider” problem of the provision of public
goods. They showed that, after a divorce, the non-custodial parent may lose control over the allocation decisions
of the custodial parent and therefore chooses to make inadequate payment or even to stop making payment at all.
This suggests that one needs to pay attention to the pervasiveness of divorces and marital separation among the
households in the sample.
14Indonesia used to have a very high divorce rate: 13 per 1,000 population aged 15 and above in 1960, compared
to 1.8 in developed countries in the same period (Jones, 1994:p. 180). However, the rate has declined to 4.6 by 1975
and 1.1 by 1990).
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that the table only shows the current marital status of the respondents at the time of the survey.
Therefore it does not tell us whether or not the household split because of a change in marital
status. Also, split-off households headed by divorced people may be related to origin households,
for example if the origin household is the parents’ household.
The discussion about the household structure above can be concluded as follows. Split-off
households account for a large fraction of households in the sample and they are indeed different
from the original households. There is some degree of arbitrariness in defining which households are
”original” and which are ”split-off”. These facts suggest that analyzing panel of only the original
households may not be appropriate and in that respect looking at a panel of extended families seems
to be preferable. Moreover, the data also show that inter-generational relationships account for most
of the relationships between the original and the split-off households. It thus seems plausible to
hypothesize about altruism linkage within extended families in the data.
3 Model and Empirical Specification
Borrowing from the literatures on testing the dynastic nature of households and the closely related
intra-household allocation literature, Altonji et al.(1992) look at parent-children dynasties in the
PSID to test the hypothesis of extended family altruism. They investigate whether or not the
distribution of consumption between parent and children households is affected by the distribution of
their income. If parents and children were altruistically linked, then the distribution of consumption
would be independent of the distribution of income.
The model is similar to that of intra-household allocation models where parent’s utility
depends not only of his/her consumption but also from his/her child’s consumption.15 Parent
and child behave as if their consumption is based on a unitary budget constraint. In the context
of extended family, one can think of the model in terms of household of the head of the extended
family (e.g., household of the parents) and other households in the extended family (e.g., households
of their children) operating on a unitary, extended-family budget constraint.
The parent’s utility maximization problem is given by:
Uh = θhU(ch) + θkU(ck)(1)
subject to
ch.ph + ck.pk = Rh +Rk(2)
15For review on the subject of intra-household allocations, see for example, the volume edited by Haddad, Hoddinot,
and Alderman (1997). Strauss, Mwabu, and Beegle (2000) review the theories and empirical evidence on the subject.
See also Thomas (1990, 1993, 1994).
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where c is quantity of good consumed, p is price, R is resources, and h, k stands for parent and
child respectively. Note that parent and child may face different prices, for example, if they reside
in different communities. The parameter θh and θk is the weight attached by the parent to his
utility and on the utility of his child. The parent can transfer some resources T to the child so that
ck.pk = Rk + T and ch.ph = Rh − T . If the child takes T as given, then the parent will maximize
his utility over his own consumption and transfer. The ability to make transfer is the key in this
model; it is what results in a unified budget constraint. This is a typical model that can be found
in intra-household allocation literature (e.g., Thomas 1990).
The first order condition of the maximization problem above is θh.U
′(ch)
ph
= θk.U
′(ck)
pk
= λ
where λ is the marginal utility of income. Suppose now that the utility function is of the form
U(c) = c1−γ/1− γ. To the first order conditions of the problem, we can add an index i denoting an
extended family and error terms to obtain:
log cih = −( 1
γi
) log λi + (
1
γi
) log θih − ( 1
γi
) log pih + uih(3)
and
log cik = −( 1
γi
) log λi + (
1
γi
) log θik − ( 1
γi
) log pik + uik(4)
The parameter λi can be interpreted as the extended-family i fixed-effect (Altonji et al.,
1992). Since λi is the marginal utility of income, this model assumes that in an altruistic extended
family, the marginal utility of income is common among the extended family members. Note that
members’ own resources, Rk and Rh do not enter either of the consumption function. Rather, it
is the extended family’s unified resources R that enters the consumption equations through λi, the
marginal utility of income.
It is clear how the test works: if an extended family has altruistic linkages, the marginal
utilities of income of the members are the same. In the empirical specification the marginal utility
of income is represented by the extended-family fixed effects. Controlling for these fixed effects,
the parent’s income should not affect his consumption and child’s income should not affect her
consumption.
3.1 Empirical Specification of the Static Model
The demand function resulting from the first order conditions can be written as:
ch = c(λikt, pikt;xikt), k = 1, 2, ..., ni, i = 1, 2, ..., N(5)
where cikt is logarithm of consumption at time t of household k , which is a member of extended
family i, pikt is the price vector, and xikt represents household observable characteristics and other
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variables that might affect household weights θh and θk. The empirical specification of the demand
function can be written as:
cikt = β′xikt + ξpikt + αit + uikt(6)
where uikt is the error term that uncorrelated with xikt. The altruistic linkage between households in
an extended family is the common marginal utility of income (λ in the model), and it is represented
by the extended-family fixed-effects, αit in equation (6) - thus αit represents log λt. If all members
of an extended family reside in the same community, it is likely that they will face the same price
vector pikt. The extended-family fixed-effects αit will then also capture prices faced by the family.
However, when some members of the extended family live in other community, this may no longer
be true. In this case we need to add community prices as additional explanatory variables.
The income pooling test is performed by estimating the following equation:
cikt = β′xikt +ΨYikt + ξpikt + αit + uikt(7)
where Yikt is household k’s own income. The error term uikt contains unobserved household char-
acteristics that may or may not be correlated with income.
It is first assumed that the error term uikt (which is uncorrelated with xikt ) is also uncor-
related with Yikt. Under the null hypothesis of the extended-family altruism, the coefficient on Yikt
should be zero. That is, after controlling for own household characteristics and the extended-family
fixed-effects, household’s own income should not affect its consumption.
However, the assumption that the error term uikt is uncorrelated with Yikt may not hold.
Observable household characteristics xikt may not fully capture the factors that belong to θh and
θk. These omitted variables will end up in the uikt and they maybe correlated with Yikt. Extended-
family fixed effect estimation only sweeps away parts of the unobservables that are common across all
households, while parts that are household-specific and vary across the households will remain. One
way to deal with the problem is to find instrumental variables for income and use 2SLS estimation.
In addition, 2SLS estimation could also help us deal with problem of measurement error in the
income variables.
Even if one fails to accept the null that the coefficient on Yikt is zero, it is still interesting
to see whether household consumption is affected by income of other household in the extended
household. For example, one could directly estimate the following equation:
cikt = β′xikt +ΨYikt + φ
∑
j
Yijt + ξpikt + αit + uikt, j 6= k(8)
where
∑
j Yijt is the sum of logarithm of income of other households in the extended family. Under
the null hypothesis that households within an extended family do not pool their income at all, the
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coefficient on the other households’ income variable, Ψ, is zero. Again, here one also needs to worry
whether the error terms are correlated with Yikt or
∑
j Yijt.
3.2 Dynamic Specification
Consider an extended family i, with households k = 1, ..., ni, facing the state of nature s = 1, ..., S
with known probability of occurrence pis. The discount factor is given by β, 0 < β < 1. As before,
θk denotes the household weight of household k in the extended family i. When the households
pool their resources, the maximization program that is faced by the extended family is that of
maximizing the sum of weighted utilities:
max
ni∑
k=1
θk
T∑
t=1
βt
S∑
s=1
pisU(ckt)(9)
subject to, assuming no borrowing:
ni∑
k=1
ckt.pkt =
ni∑
k=1
Rkt(10)
For each household k in state s at time t, the first order conditions with respect to ck, is:
θk.β
t.pis.U
′(ckt) = µt.pkt(11)
or
θk.U
′(ckt)
pkt
= λt(12)
where λt = µt/βt.pis and µt is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraints at time t.16 Note
that λt is common across all households ki. Note also that this first-order condition should hold
at any time t. Assuming that the utility function is U(c) = c1−γ/1− γ, one can take logs and solve
for consumption of household k and add an index i denoting the extended family to obtain:
log cikt = −( 1
γi
) log λit + (
1
γi
) log θk − ( 1
γi
) log pikt + uikt(13)
We can then first-difference consumption over the two period t and t− 1 to obtain:
log cikt − log cikt−1 = −( 1
γi
)(log λit − log λit−1)− ( 1
γi
)(log pikt − log pikt−1)
+(uikt − uikt−1)(14)
First-differencing sweeps away the time-invariant household weight θk. Household k’s own
income change does not enter into determination of the household’s consumption change. The
16This dynamic maximization problem is similar to the problem studied by Townsend (1994). The difference there
is that the weighted sum of utilities is over all individuals and over all households in the village, resulting in common
Lagrange multipliers across all individuals in the village. The maximization problem is also similar to that discussed
by Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991)
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extended family’s income change does, however, affect change in consumption through the change
in marginal utility of income. The statistical representation of the dynamic specification can be
written as follows:
∆cikt = β′∆xikt + ξ∆pikt +∆αit +∆uikt(15)
where ∆cikt = cikt − cikt−1 , ∆xikt = xikt − xikt−1, ∆pikt = cikt − cikt−1,∆αikt = αikt −
αikt−1,∆cikt = cikt − cikt−1. The dynamic test is performed by including the change in house-
hold k’s income, ∆Yikt = Yikt − Yikt−1:
∆cikt = β′∆xikt + ψ∆Yikt + ξ∆pikt +∆αit +∆uikt(16)
Note that equation (16) is also the first-differenced version of the empirical specification
given by equation (7). In the static specification, the extended-family fixed effect αi represents the
log of marginal utility of income that is common across all households in extended family i. Here,
∆αit represents the difference in the log of marginal utility of income across periods. Since ∆αit is
independent of k, then it will be the same across all households. Controlling for these fixed-effects,
changes in household own income should not affect changes in household consumption. Household-
specific factors belonging to the household weights θk but that are not fully captured by ∆xikt, are
swept away by the first-differencing, provided they are time-invariant. This means that the test
allows for the possibility that the extended families have different - but time-invariant - preferences
over the households (Altonji et al., 1992).
Consider the case where the extended families consist of a parents’ household, the son’s
household, and the daughter’s household. Suppose that the parents prefer to invest more in human
capital of the sons’ household. Then the static version of this model at time t, would be:
cikt = β′xikt +ΨYikt + φ
∑
j
Yijt + ξpikt + αit + δik + uikt,(17)
k = 0, 1, ..., ni, i = 1, 2, ..., N
where δik represents the household-specific time-invariant constant. In other words, δik can be seen
as household fixed-effects that differ between the son’s and the daughter’s household and that may
be correlated with the son’s and daughter’s income. Preferences towards the son’s household imply
that δik is larger for his household than that for his sister’s. Everything else the same, the son’s
household will have higher consumption and earnings. If the household fixed effect is time-invariant,
the first-differencing will sweep δik away, and this is what is shown in equation (16). To correct for
potential measurement error in income, we also employ 2SLS for the dynamic tests.17
17The assumption that the household weights, θk, are time-invariant may not be true. In fact, it is in contrast
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4 Data
4.1 Data
Monthly household consumption is calculated using all consumption expenditures including durable
goods. For housing expenditures, rental value of housing is used (actual if available, imputed
otherwise). The household composition variables are household size, proportion of children age 0-5,
6-14, adult 15-59 (male, female), 60 or above (male, female), age of the head of household. We
also include a dummy variable whether a household is a male-headed household, and whether the
household is a farm household. Maximum years of education of adults in the household is used
as the household education variable.18 19 We also use dummy variables for province and urban
residence. Community (enumeration area, approximately the size of a village) median wages for
males and females were calculated from earnings and hours worked of those who earned labor income
including those who were self-employed. Community median prices of sugar and cooking oil are used
since these were the two prices for which data were available for the majority of the households both
in 1997 and 2000. The prices were prices that the household paid for the last purchases in the past
month.
Monthly household income was calculated using labor earnings of individuals in the house-
hold, earnings from self-employment, net sales of farm and non-farm assets, rental income from
household assets, gross sales of non-business assets, and other non-labor income excluding transfers.
Transfer income is excluded since what we want to test is whether the extended household’s re-
sources matter to household consumption after controlling for household income, without explicitly
accounting for transfers. All values are in December 2000 prices.
with results in collective household models (e.g. Chiappori, 1988). In the collective household models, the sharing
rule that governs how much each member can spend the remaining income after the household allocates its resources
on household public goods, is endogenous. Prices, total household income, and other time-varying factors such as
assets of each individual determine the sharing rule. On the contrary, in the example above that the extended family
has an unequal but time-invariant sharing rule, which is in favor toward the son’s household. Under the null above,
qk are time-invariant. If θk include time-varying household specific factors, first-differencing will not get rid of these
factors, even with extended family fixed effect, and there can still be factors that determine θk that are correlated
with ∆Yikt. This is another reason why instrumenting changes in income would be helpful even after adding the
extended-household fixed-effects.
18Information in schooling is collected on the highest education level attended and the highest grade completed at
the level. The information is then converted into a variable on completed years of schooling. The value ranges from
0 (no schooling or not completed first grade) to 17 (university graduate).
19One could also use average education of the adult instead of maximum. Jolliffe (1997) uses data on households in
Ghana to tests which of the following education variables matter most in determining household income: household
head’s schooling, maximum schooling of adults, or average schooling of adult. The results show that either maximum
or average schooling of adults is a better measure than schooling of the household head. Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996) find that maximum years of education is a better predictor of the adoption of the new agricultural technology
during the Indian ”Green Revolution”.
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4.2 Instrumenting Income
Income variables are notoriously hard to measure without error.20 In particular, the income variables
may be measured with errors in the sense of classical errors-in-variables, biasing the coefficient on
income towards zero. Failure to take into account possible measurement error may lead to incorrectly
failing to reject the null hypothesis of income pooling.
To correct for this potential problem, we use instrumental variables that are predictive of
income but that can reasonably be excluded from the consumption regressions.21
The set of IVs we use in the static specifications consists of the value of land, farm pro-
ductive assets, and non-farm productive assets (all in logs). Farm productive assets include plants,
house or building used for farm business, livestock/poultry/fish pond, vehicles, tractor, heavy farm
equipment, and other assets used in the farm business. Non-farm productive assets include building,
vehicles, and other equipment used in the non-farm business. By using these variables as identifying
IVs, we have to assume that these assets are predictive of income but are not correlated with the
error term in the consumption regressions, an assumption that may be contentious for some. 22
We also employ the use of instrumental variables in the dynamic tests. In addition to
allowing the possibility of household specific fixed-effects, the dynamic test may help us solve the
systematic measurement error problem. For example, if richer households under-report more than
poorer households, and if the measurement errors are unchanged between survey waves, then, these
errors will be differenced out. However, there is still a potential problem of random measurement
error. In addition, changes in income may also be endogenous.
To correct for these, in the dynamic specifications, we use as instruments: lagged value
of land owned (value in 1997), lagged value of non-land productive assets, and the change in the
value of land between 1997 and 2000. Using changes in productive assets to instrument changes
in income may potentially induce additional endogeneity into the model. Changes in income may
affect investment in productive assets which in turns may be correlated with consumption changes.
By using lagged values of assets as instruments, we are assuming that they are uncorrelated with the
error terms in the first-differenced consumption equation. In addition to the 1997 lagged value of
20As noted by Deaton (1997),”...All of the difficulties of measuring consumption - imputations, recall bias, season-
ality, long questionnaires- apply with a greater force to the measurement of income...”
21Note, however, that while the instrument variables may help correct for random measurement errors, they may
not help in solving the systematic measurement errors. Indeed, Table 4 shows that for the 2000 target households,
the mean value of household income is roughly 70 percent of household expenditure, and for the split-off households
the corresponding number is about 65 percent. The numbers seem to indicate there may be a serious underreporting
of income that may or may not be systematic.
22In particular it is likely that the productive assets are correlated with the Pareto weights θ, which means that the
IVs are not valid. In other specifications, we try to use community infrastructure variables as additional instrumental
variables (see Witoelar, 2004). Data from the Village Potential Statistics (the PODES) collected by the Central
Bureau of Statistics were used. Unfortunately, none of the IVs that were obtained from the PODES contribute
significantly to explaining variation in household income in the first stage regressions.
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land owned, we also include the change in log value of land. The claim is that the potential problem
of endogeneity resulting from using the change in land value is substantially less than if we were to
use changes in value of other productive assets. The data shows that between 1997 and 2000 there
were very few incidence of land sales, only 1.5 percent out of all land ownerships. The total value
of those sales was only about 0.5 percent out of total values of land owned. The change in land
value might be the result of investment in land such as improvement in irrigation system. However,
during the three-year period there was no large irrigation project that was being carried out. The
variation of real land values owned between the periods is likely driven by the change in prices that
occur between 1997 and 2000. In some specifications we also add the interaction of changes in the
median wage of males and females with the 1997 household maximum years of education. Changes
in wages between the periods may affect households differently depending on the level of education
in the households.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Static Specifications
We begin by estimating the static model with and without extended-household fixed-effects for all
households in 1997 and 2000. The consumption regressions with and without the extended-family
fixed-effects are estimated. First, the models are estimated without instrumental variables. Next,
we estimate the models using 2SLS.
Table 9 summarizes the result of the static tests. The table reports only the coefficient on
log of household income from the various specifications. Regression results showing coefficients on
the other covariates are reported in Appendix Table 1-3.
The first panel of Table 9 shows the result from estimating equation (5) using the sample
of 1997 household. The second panel shows the result for the 2000 households. While the results
are similar qualitatively, we focus the attention to 2000 split-off households which consist of a much
larger fraction of households in 2000 than in 1997.23
The first thing to note is that estimations without using any instrumental variables result
in very low coefficients on income although they are statistically significant. It ranges from 0.022
to 0.026. It is clear however that the coefficients on income are small in magnitude; they translate
23The estimates of the coefficients on household income under 2SLS using the sample of parent-daughter extended
families for 1997 stood out as much greater those of other samples; 1.509 (standard error 0.494) and 1.205 (0.646)
without and with fixed effect, respectively. However, the identifying IVs fail the over-identification tests miserably;
the null hypothesis that the equation is properly specified and the instruments are valid instruments (p-values is 0.000
in each case) is rejected. The same is also true for the sample of parent-son extended families in 1997, although the
estimates are not as high as those for parent-daughter extended families.
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into income elasticity of consumption of .022 to 0.026. This is consistent with the possibility that
the income variables suffer from measurement error.
Looking at the regression results in Appendix Table 1, it is clear that most of the explanatory
variables appear to be statistically significant when we estimate the consumption equation without
extended family fixed effect. Column (1) shows that the coefficient on income for the sample of
household in multi-member extended families is 0.022 and it is statistically significant at 1 percent
level. Having fixed effect in the estimation does not seem to change this coefficient by any significant
magnitude. Note however that some of the community-level variable became statistically insignifi-
cant after using the fixed effect. Large fraction of the households reside in the same community as
the other households in their extended households, so the extended family fixed-effects sweep away
some of the community level variables. Similar results are obtained using the sample of parent-child
extended families (column 3 and 4 in Appendix Table 1).
The summary of the results of the 2SLS estimation is also presented in Table 9. The second
stage regressions for the sample of extended families with multiple households and parent-child
extended families are reported in Appendix Table 2.24 The corresponding first stage regressions are
reported in Appendix Table 3.
The coefficients on household income in the 2SLS estimations are greater than in the OLS
estimations by as much as ten-fold. For the sample of 2000 extended households, the coefficient on
household income under 2SLS is 0.216 (with standard error 0.031). This represents a jump of almost
ten times the OLS estimate of 0.022.25 Controlling for fixed effects, the coefficient drops to 0.135
(with standard error 0.028) - lower than without controlling for fixed effects- but six times higher
than in the specification without instrumental variables (0.021). The IVs pass the overidentification
tests for this sample. The p-values for the Hausman tests with the null that the variable log of
household real income is exogenous are 0.000 (column 1-4, Appendix Table 2) suggesting that
instrumental variables estimations are required.
Since the model is derived from a model of parental altruism, we are particularly interested
in whether using the sample of only parent-child extended families would produce different results.
It turns out that the results are very similar (column 3 and 4 in Appendix Table 2). For the
parent-child extended families the coefficient on income under 2SLS but without fixed effect is 0.218
(standard error 0.035) and after controlling for fixed effects it drops to 0.128 (standard error 0.044).
Coefficient on income before controlling for fixed effects is highest using the sample of parent-son
24For 1997, only the estimates of the coefficients on household income are presented in Table 9. The regression
results are not reported but are available upon request.
25Altonji et al.(1992) reports income elasticities of food consumption of around 0.240-0.286 for US households.
However, this is arguably not comparable to the results above since one would expect that food in the US would be
far less sensitive than all consumption in a developing country.
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extended families; it is 0.284 (standard error 0.062), but after fixed effect it became virtually the
same as from the sample of parent-daughter extended families. Except for the 2SLS estimate with
fixed effects for the sample of parent-daughter extended families, the IVs pass the over-identification
tests. As noted above, the Hausman tests suggest that income is indeed endogenous.
The results thus far seem to suggest that the household’s own income matters even after
controlling for the extended-family fixed-effects. The estimations without instrumental variables
show that the coefficients on income are small in magnitude and almost the same with and without
the fixed effects. 2SLS estimations provide us with more reasonable estimates of the coefficients on
income. Under 2SLS, controlling for extended-family fixed-effects does decrease the coefficients on
income significantly (around 40 to 60 percent decrease for 2000 households) but the coefficients on
income after accounting for fixed effect are still statistically significant.26
5.2 Dynamic Specification
Table 10 presents the summary of results from the dynamic tests. Without controlling for the
extended-family fixed effects, the coefficient on changes in log (household real income) is positive
and statistically significant, although the magnitude, 0.017 is very small. After adding the extended-
family fixed effects, the income coefficient is slightly greater (0.020), and it is still statistically
significant. As in the static version, 2SLS would provide a better estimate about the effects of the
changes in household income on changes in consumption, provided the instrumental variables are
valid. The second stage regression results for all extended families and for parent-child extended
families are reported in Appendix Table 7 and 9, respectively. The first stage regression results for
the corresponding samples are reported in Appendix Table 8 and 10, respectively.
The F-tests for the identifying instrumental variables reported in Appendix Table 8 and
10 suggest that the instrumental variables contribute in predicting changes in income. The first
2SLS specification use lagged land value 1997 as well as changes in land value between the 1997 and
2000. Using the sample of all extended families, the coefficient on income changes is 0.132 (standard
error 0.049) before adding the fixed effects. After accounting for extended-family fixed-effects, the
coefficient drops to 0.059 (standard error 0.033). Similar results were obtained using the sample
of parent-child extended families. Note that while the test can reject the null that the change in
household income is endogenous in the specification without the extended-family fixed-effects, the
test fails to reject the null when the fixed effects are controlled for. This suggests that there is no
26We also estimate the static regressions using community dummy variables in place of prices and wages. The
results are shown in Appendix Table 4 and 5. Identification comes from extended families with members living
in different communities. Around 60 percent of the extended families do span across different communities. The
coefficient on own income is 20 percent lower (0.203 compared to 0.256) after controlling for extended-household
fixed-effects and it is statistically significant.
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need to treat the change in income as an endogenous variable when we include the fixed-effects.
Nonetheless, the estimations appear to be well identified and the coefficient after controlling for fixed
effects under 2SLS (0.059), and under OLS (0.020) are both significantly lower than the estimates
under 2SLS before controlling for fixed effects. It is reasonable to conclude that controlling for
extended-family fixed-effects, the effects of a change in household own income on the change in
household own consumption are small.
When we add lagged value of productive assets as an additional instruments, the results do
not change much, although now the coefficient on income changes after accounting for fixed effect
are slightly higher. However the instrumental variables did not pass the over-identification test,
especially after accounting for extended family fixed effect. Using changes in median wage of male
and female interacted with the household education variable in 1997 to capture different effects of
wage changes on household income depending on education level of the household, the coefficient
on income before accounting for fixed effects are much lower than in previous specifications. But
again, the instrumental variables perform very poorly in over-identification tests.
The results from the dynamic specifications show that changes in distribution of resources
does affect changes in distribution of consumption among households in extended households, sug-
gesting that households may not fully pool their resources to cope with economic shock they were
facing. However, the coefficients on the change of own income after controlling for extended family
fixed-effects become small.
5.3 Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own Household’s Consump-
tion?
Including income of other households from the same extended family directly in consumption regres-
sion may provide some insight about the role of other households’ income in household consumption.
Note that this is not a formal test of consumption smoothing: it will just tell us whether the coeffi-
cient on other households’ income is statistically significant. If it is, then it indicates that resources
of other households do play a role in determining household consumption.
As instruments, we use own household’s as well as other households’ log of land value, farm
and non-farm productive assets. However, the instrumental variables failed the over-identification
tests (p-values = 0.039 and 0.052) for the sample of extended families with multiple households
and parent-child extended families, respectively. The Hausman tests suggest that other households’
income is not endogenous in the household consumption equation. Overall, the results seem to show,
at least in the static context, that income of other households does not play any role in determining
own household consumption (see Appendix Table 11 and 12).
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In addition, we also estimate a reduced form regression of household consumption by re-
gressing log of household consumption not on the income variables but on all of the exogenous
explanatory variables included belonging to own household as well as other households, and also on
log value of land, farm, and non-farm productive assets of own and other households (see Appendix
Table 13). The F-test of other household variables in these regressions are 2.09 (p-value=0.001) and
2.02 (p-value=0.001) for the sample of extended families with multiple households and parent-child
extended households, respectively. This suggests that other households’ variables do have some
effects, if only small, on households’ own consumption.
This result is related to the body of literature that looks at the outcome of linked house-
holds. For example, Foster (1993) looked at the effects of household partition in rural Bangladesh
on child’s schooling. In particular the study asks whether decision on child’s schooling depend on re-
sources available to a particular household or to resources available to all the linked and neighboring
households as a whole.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that there is evidence against income pooling within extended families,
both in the static and dynamic settings. The findings show that household own income and income
changes affect consumption and consumption changes even after adding the extended-family fixed-
effects. In terms of the magnitudes of the income (and income changes) coefficients, the results are
mixed. The static tests return estimates that range from 0.127 to 0.135 after controlling for fixed
effect. These magnitudes are economically significant and suggest that we can strongly reject the
income pooling hypothesis. This in itself is perhaps not surprising: even within households, income
pooling is almost always rejected in most empirical studies.
The more interesting results come from the dynamic tests that show that controlling for
extended family fixed-effects, the magnitudes of the coefficient on income change seem to be small
(0.067 to 0.090), although they are statistically significant. This suggests that at least to some
degree, households within an extended family do pool their resources. The findings also suggest
that although extended family do not fully act as a unitary household , allocation decisions may be
made at the extended family level. This implies that, under some conditions, looking at a panel of
extended families may be preferable to using only panel of ”original” household when one wants to
analyze household consumption or income changes.
It is also important to note that pooling resources is not the only mechanism available to
the households to cope with economic crisis. Frankenberg, Smith, and Thomas (2003), using data
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from IFLS2 (1997) and IFLS2+ (1998) - a shorter period of observation- show how households in
Indonesia use the sale of a type of asset that was least affected by the crisis, namely gold, as a way
to cope with the crisis. Yet another mechanism that may have been used by the households is to
change living arrangement (e.g., members moving out of households in some cases, or joining other
households in other case), a household decision that we assume to be exogenous in this paper.27
Perhaps one of the more important lessons to be learned from this research is the fact
that inter-household ties may be be influential in shaping household allocation decisions. Rejection
against extended family income pooling does not mean that extended families do not behave as a
single household in other dimension of household behavior. One possible extension of this study is
then to look whether and how inter-household ties affect other household behavior such as labor
market supply, home production, and investment in human capita. The study by Foster (1993) on
the effects of household partition in rural Bangladesh on child schooling is one of the few studies
that looks at the effects of linked household resources on household outcome.
One important issue that is not being addressed in this paper is the process of household
break-up and formation. In this paper we treat household structure and composition as exogenous,
although family formation and dissolution are themselves results of economic decisions. One could
extend the study by incorporating the endogeneity of household break-up and formation into the
analysis of inter-household ties and household outcomes.
27Excluding household composition variables from the specifications does not change the result qualitatively, al-
though the coefficient on income and the change in income increase slightly. For example, the coefficient on the
change income in column (1) of Table 10 and with the extended-family fixed-effects increases from 0.059 to 0.091
when we exclude household composition variables. Without the extended-family fixed effects the coefficient in column
(1) increases from 0.132 to 0.171.
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Table 1. Household Re-contact Rates
All IFLS2 Re-contact IFLS3 All IFLS3 Recontact
IFLS1 Members Households Rate (%) Target Members Households Rates (%)
Number of Households Died Contacted Households Died Contacted
IFLS1 households 7,224 69 6,752 94.3 7,152 32 6,768 95.1
IFLS2 split-off households - - 877 - 877 2 817 93.4
IFLS2+ split-off households - - - - 338 0 311 92
IFLS3 target households - - - - 8,370 34 7,896 94.7
IFLS3 split-off households - - - - - - 2,645 -
Total households contacted 7,224 69 7,629 34 10,541
Re-contact rates are conditional on at least some household members living. Households that recombined into other households
are included in the number of households contacted. IFLS3 target households are IFLS1 households, IFLS2 split-off households
and IFLS2+ split-off households
Table 2. Number of Households Interviewed:
Target vs. Split-off Households
1993 1997 2000
Households interviewed 7,224 7,619 10,435
Target households interviewed 7,224 6,742 7,790
Split-off households interviewed - 877 2,645
Table 3. Relationship of the members of the 2000 target households
to household head and their membership in the 2000 target households
Relationship to HH members New HH Total
household head re-interviewed members
Head 7,460 330 7,790
Spouse 5,708 277 5,985
Child,S/D-in-law 13,075 2,675 15,750
Parent,F/M-in-law 812 174 986
Sibling,B/S-in-law 378 140 518
Other relative 1,537 1,289 2,826
Non-relative 95 174 269
Total 29,065 5,059 34,124
Table 4. Target vs Split-off Households, IFLS3 (2000)
2000 Target households 2000 Split-off Households
Number of households 7,505 2,517
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
HH expenditure (Rp) 1,031,107 (1,168,745) 979,148 (1,101,291)
HH income (Rp) 726,652 (1,169,290) 641,019 (1,120,006)
Per capita expenditure (Rp) 261,172 (300,586) 329,163 (378,229)
Per capita income (Rp) 179,210 (328,189) 202,137 (362,724)
Household size 4.39 (2.01) 3.62 (2.10)
Number of hh members:
0-5 years 0.47 (0.68) 0.63 (0.72)
6-14 years 0.85 (0.99) 0.36 (0.73)
15-59 years, male 1.26 (0.96) 1.22 (0.94)
15-59 years, female 1.37 (0.89) 1.23 (0.90)
60+ years, male 0.19 (0.40) 0.07 (0.27)
60+ years, female 0.24 (0.45) 0.10 (0.31)
Male household head (=1) 0.82 (0.39) 0.85 (0.36)
Age of hh head 49.41 (14.1) 34.72 (13.94)
Maximum years of education 9.04 (4.24) 10.19 (3.93)
Farm households (=1) 0.41 (0.49) 0.24 (0.43)
Urban 0.46 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50)
* After dropping observations with missing values
Table 5. Number of Household and Extended Families
1997 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Extended families 6,742 6,382 6,774 6,698 6,175
Households 7,619 7,152 10,435 10,022 8,351
Extended families with multiple households 791 703 2,610 2,450 1,723
Households 1,668 1,473 6,271 5,774 3,899
Parent-child extended families 653 562 2,176 2,070 1,510
Households 1,343 1,172 5,075 4,785 3,377
1) All 1997 households.
2) After dropping households with missing observations.
3) All 2000 households.
4) After dropping households with missing observations.
5) After dropping households that cannot be matched with 1997 households.
Table 6.
Current marital status of the heads of the households, IFLS3 (2000)
2000 Target Households Split-off households
Male Female Total Male Female Total
% has never married 1.5 6.5 2.4 11.3 49.4 17.4
% married 95 15.7 80.7 87.6 18.2 76.5
% separated 0.2 3.3 0.7 0 3.5 0.6
% divorced 0.5 10 2.2 0.3 7.3 1.4
% widow/er 2.8 64.5 13.9 0.8 21.5 4.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number of observations 6384 1406 7790 2222 423 2645
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics:Extended Families
with Multiple Households, IFLS3 (2000)
Number of extended families 1,723
Number of households 3,889
Mean Std. Dev
HH expenditure (Rp) 983,498 (1,000,331)
HH income (Rp) 672,242 (1,085,537)
Per capita expenditure (Rp) 294,662 (331,967)
Per capita income (Rp) 189,583 (330,464)
Household size 3.93 (2.07)
Number of hh members:
0-5 years 0.49 (0.68)
6-14 years 0.56 (0.87)
15-59 years, male 1.24 (0.97)
15-59 years, female 1.3 (0.89)
60+ years, male 0.15 (0.36)
60+ years, female 0.18 (0.40)
Male household head (=1) 0.82 (0.39)
Age of hh head 43.54 (16.23)
Maximum years of education 9.56 (4.06)
Farm households (=1) 0.32 (0.47)
Urban (=1) 0.5 (0.50)
Median wage, male (Rp) 1,888 (2,221)
Median wage, female (Rp) 1,098 (2,608)
Median prices of sugar (Rp) 3,692 (451)
Median prices of oil (Rp) 3,510 (241)
Land value (Rp) 8,412,357 (39,100,000)
Value of farm prod. assets (Rp) 1,302,529 (8,585,182)
Value of non-farm prod. assets (Rp) 4,148,803 (32,500,000)
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics: Parent-Child Extended Families , IFLS3 (2000)
Number of extended families 1,510
Number of households 3,377
Parent households Child households Parent, child households
(n=1,451) (n=1,672) (n=254)
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
HH expenditure (Rp) 982,448 (947,128) 983,004 (1,037,599) 883,395 (786,430)
HH income (Rp) 727,319 (999,774) 618,111 (1,108,942) 629,633 (1,351,942)
Per capita expenditure (Rp) 265,465 (287,640) 328,564 (378,505) 241,681 (244,088)
Per capita income (Rp) 193,671 (288,280) 189,975 (364,352) 167,239 (387,782)
Household size 4.22 (2.06) 3.64 (2.04) 4.13 (2.02)
Number of hh members:
0-5 years 0.34 (0.64) 0.60 (0.69) 0.54 (0.68)
6-14 years 0.66 (0.95) 0.44 (0.79) 0.84 (0.95)
15-59 years, male 1.28 (0.97) 1.23 (0.94) 1.07 (1.16)
15-59 years, female 1.40 (0.89) 1.24 (0.89) 1.30 (0.79)
60+ years, male 0.27 (0.44) 0.06 (0.24) 0.13 (0.34)
60+ years, female 0.28 (0.46) 0.07 (0.27) 0.24 (0.43)
Male household head (=1) 0.82 (0.39) 0.86 (0.35) 0.59 (0.49)
Age of hh head 54.41 (11.80) 33.29 (13.23) 46.87 (14.13)
Maximum years of education 8.95 (4.28) 10.3 (3.69) 8.62 (3.92)
Farm households (=1) 0.42 (0.49) 0.24 (0.42) 0.36 (0.48)
Urban (=1) 0.47 (0.50) 0.54 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50)
Median wage, male (Rp) 1,602 (1090.00) 2,178 (2966.00) 1,687 (1934.00)
Median wage, female (Rp) 855 (1383.00) 1,266 (2401.00) 1,320 (6835.00)
Median prices of sugar (Rp) 3,680 (466.00) 3,705 (450.00) 3,721 (402.00)
Median prices of oil (Rp) 3,499 (243.00) 3,521 (240.00) 3,502 (238.00)
Land value (Rp) 13,100,000 (48,100,000) 4,843,583 (28,900,000) 7,188,051 (40,700,000)
Value of farm bus.assets (Rp) 1,973,674 (11,900,000) 769,319 (3,917,893) 1,504,460 (9,487,436)
Value of non-farm bus.assets (Rp) 3,805,023 (22,100,000) 4,272,634 (40,300,000) 3,150,708 (20,400,000)
Table 9. Effect of household own income on household consumption
OLS 2SLS
No Fixed Extended-Family No Fixed Extended-Family Extended
Effects Fixed-Effects Effects Fixed-Effects Families Households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1997 households
Households in extended families
with multiple households 0.026 0.024 0.23 0.187 703 1,473
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.050)*** (0.048)***
Parent-child extended families 0.023 0.026 0.214 0.151 562 1,172
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.057)*** (0.043)***
2000 households
Households in extended families
with multiple households 0.026 0.025 0.239 0.161 2,450 5,774
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.026)*** (0.023)***
Parent-child extended families 0.022 0.022 0.251 0.154 2,070 4,785
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.032)*** (0.025)***
2000 households that can be matched with 1997 households
Households in extended families
with multiple households 0.022 0.021 0.216 0.135 1,723 3,899
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.031)*** (0.028)***
Parent-child extended families 0.020 0.019 0.218 0.128 1,510 3,377
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.035)*** (0.031)***
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Regression results showing the coefficients on other covariates for the sample of 2000 households that can be matched
with 1997 households are reported in Appendix Table 1-4. Results for the other samples are not reported.
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Appendix Table 1. Static tests: 2000 Extended Families with Multiple Households
and Parent-Child Extended Families
Dependent variable: Extended families with Parent-child
log (household expenditure) multiple households extended families
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
log(household income) 0.022 0.021 0.02 0.019
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
log(household size) 0.408 0.521 0.41 0.556
(0.035)*** (0.042)*** (0.037)*** (0.045)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 0.564 0.303 0.594 0.307
(0.077)*** (0.098)*** (0.082)*** (0.105)***
15-59 years, male 0.424 0.299 0.483 0.377
(0.078)*** (0.094)*** (0.085)*** (0.101)***
15-59 years, female 0.498 0.320 0.513 0.355
(0.080)*** (0.102)*** (0.086)*** (0.110)***
60+ years, male 0.548 0.276 0.536 0.257
(0.110)*** (0.133)** (0.122)*** (0.148)*
60+ years, female 0.258 0.102 0.245 0.205
(0.140)* (0.158) (0.155) (0.172)
Male household head (=1) 0.147 0.138 0.146 0.123
(0.032)*** (0.042)*** (0.034)*** (0.045)***
Age of hh head 0.019 0.014 0.021 0.017
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Age of hh head (squared) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Maximum years of education 0.068 0.042 0.068 0.040
(0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)***
Farm households (=1) -0.036 -0.040 -0.036 -0.048
(0.024) (0.033) (0.026) (0.035)
log (median wage), male 0.092 0.043 0.089 0.040
(0.018)*** (0.022)* (0.019)*** (0.024)*
log (median wage), female 0.032 0.025 0.032 0.011
(0.012)*** (0.017) (0.013)** (0.018)
log (median prices of sugar) -0.414 0.313 -0.336 0.310
(0.170)** (0.321) (0.178)* (0.342)
log (median prices of oil) 0.268 0.017 0.281 -0.137
(0.109)** (0.196) (0.117)** (0.207)
Constant 11.623 8.505 10.871 9.84
(1.605)*** (3.034)*** (1.700)*** (3.248)***
Number of households 3899 3899 3377 3377
R-squared 0.42 0.33 0.42 0.33
Number of extended-families 1723 1510
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are proportion of hh members age 0-4, female hh head,
and non-farm household. Variables included in the estimations but not reported on the table are province and urban dummy
variables and province-urban dummy interactions.
Appendix Table 2. Static tests with 2SLS: 2000 Extended Families and Parent-Child Extended Families
Dependent variable: Extended families with Parent-child
log (household expenditure) multiple households extended families
2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed 2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed
Fixed Effects Effects Fixed Effects Effects
Log(household income) 0.216 0.135 0.218 0.128
(0.031)*** (0.028)*** (0.035)*** (0.031)***
Log(household size) 0.086 0.361 0.109 0.429
-0.069 (0.063)*** -0.073 (0.063)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 1.099 0.585 1.2 0.604
(0.141)*** (0.135)*** (0.162)*** (0.149)***
15-59 years, male 0.528 0.381 0.638 0.471
(0.109)*** (0.113)*** (0.121)*** (0.121)***
15-59 years, female 0.569 0.353 0.643 0.427
(0.115)*** (0.120)*** (0.127)*** (0.130)***
60+ years, male 0.775 0.336 0.695 0.257
(0.156)*** (0.157)** (0.173)*** -0.172
60+ years, female 0.471 0.237 0.489 0.334
(0.186)** (0.189) (0.207)** -0.204
Male household head (=1) -0.202 -0.086 -0.211 -0.091
(0.072)*** (0.074) (0.080)*** -0.08
Age of hh head -0.038 -0.02 -0.042 -0.02
(0.010)*** (0.010)** (0.012)*** (0.012)*
Age of hh head (squared) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Maximum years of education 0.052 0.029 0.053 0.027
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)***
Farm households (=1) -0.092 -0.105 -0.074 -0.1
(0.035)*** (0.042)** (0.037)** (0.044)**
log (median wage), male 0.053 0.017 0.055 0.026
(0.023)** (0.027) (0.025)** (0.028)
log (median wage), female 0.014 0.008 0.005 -0.009
(0.016) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
log (median prices of sugar) -0.383 0.289 -0.298 0.289
(0.232)* -0.379 -0.251 (0.399)
log (median prices of oil) 0.149 0.176 0.236 0.096
(0.160) (0.234) (0.173) (0.250)
Constant 12.411 7.488 11.021 8.111
(2.220)*** (3.585)** (2.417)*** (3.821)**
p-values for null hypothesis that:
- IVs are valid (overidentification test) 0.89 0.21 0.93 0.22
- log (hh income) is exogenous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of households 3899 3899 3377 3377
Number of extended families 1510
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are proportion of hh members age 0-4,female hh head,
and non-farm household. Variables included in the estimations but not reported on the table are province and urban dummy
variables and province-urban dummy interactions. Instrumental variables not included in the first stage regressions are:
log of real value of land owned, farm productive assets, and non-farm productive assets.
Appendix Table 3. Static Tests with 2SLS:
First Stage Regression, 2000 Extended Families and Parent-Child Extended Families
Dependent variable: Extended families with Parent-child
log (household income) multiple households extended families
2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed 2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed
Fixed Effects Effects Fixed Effects Effects
log(household size) 1.487 1.196 1.418 1.011
(0.146)*** (0.177)*** (0.207)*** (0.242)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years -2.717 -2.324 -3.116 -2.863
(0.332)*** (0.403)*** (0.440)*** (0.568)***
15-59 years, male -0.388 -0.441 -0.767 -0.982
(0.338) (0.386) (0.455)* (0.548)*
15-59 years, female -0.227 0.057 -0.738 -0.878
(0.368) (0.418) (0.493) (0.596)
60+ years, male -1.107 -0.458 -0.859 -0.165
(0.516)** (0.566) (0.689) (0.799)
60+ years, female -0.854 -1.347 -1.181 -1.368
(0.627) (0.685)** (0.802) (0.933)
Male household head (=1) 1.771 1.906 1.672 1.821
(0.155)*** (0.176)*** (0.196)*** (0.240)***
Age of hh head 0.255 0.262 0.296 0.305
(0.022)*** (0.018)*** (0.028)*** (0.024)***
Age of hh head (squared) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Maximum years of education 0.056 0.081 0.065 0.106
(0.013)*** (0.019)*** (0.017)*** (0.027)***
Farm households (=1) -0.16 -0.324 -0.213 -0.438
(0.151) (0.254) (0.187) (0.344)
log (median wage), male 0.3 0.288 0.185 0.14
(0.072)*** (0.091)*** (0.102)* (0.130)
log (median wage), female 0.131 0.132 0.157 0.203
(0.048)*** (0.070)* (0.063)** (0.097)**
log (median prices of sugar) -0.415 -1.002 -0.092 0.49
(0.724) (1.327) (0.975) (1.855)
log (median prices of oil) 0.46 0.121 0.271 -1.857
(0.466) (0.811) (0.640) (1.121)*
Instrumental variables excluded from the second stage:
log (land value) 0.011 0.039 0.009 0.048
(0.005)** (0.011)*** (0.007) (0.016)***
log (value of farm prod.assets) 0.037 0.047 0.036 0.047
(0.012)*** (0.021)** (0.015)** (0.028)*
log (value of non-farm prod.assets) 0.065 0.07 0.062 0.06
(0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)***
Constant -0.685 7.12 -1.605 11.754
(6.775) (12.412) (9.255) (17.601)
F-test of exclusionary restrictions 42.28 19.43 32.41 15.82
(p-values) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of households 3899 3899 3377 3377
R-squared 0.3 0.33 0.29 0.34
Number of extended-families 1723 1510
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are proportion of hh members age 0-4, female hh head,
and non-farm household. Variables included in the estimations but not reported on the table are province and urban dummy
variables and province-urban dummy interactions.
Appendix Table 4. Static Tests with 2SLS: 2000 Extended Families with Multiple Households
and Parent-child Extended Families with Community Dummy Variables
Dependent variable: Extended families Parent-child
log (household expenditure) with multiple households extended families
2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed 2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed
Fixed Effects Effects Fixed Effects Effects
log (household income) 0.256 0.203 0.263 0.212
(0.040)*** (0.065)*** (0.048)*** (0.082)***
log(household size) -0.023 0.163 -0.009 0.206
(0.080) (0.135) (0.091) (0.145)
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 0.871 0.561 0.995 0.569
(0.131)*** (0.184)*** (0.155)*** (0.215)***
15-59 years, male 0.21 0.187 0.333 0.223
(0.115)* (0.168) (0.125)*** (0.185)
15-59 years, female 0.33 0.214 0.454 0.323
(0.117)*** (0.173) (0.128)*** (0.197)
60+ years, male 0.572 0.152 0.576 0.28
(0.156)*** (0.225) (0.173)*** (0.259)
60+ years, female 0.149 -0.181 0.161 -0.184
(0.185) (0.283) (0.205) (0.319)
Male household head (=1) -0.187 -0.179 -0.17 -0.127
(0.073)** (0.117) (0.080)** (0.128)
Age of hh head -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 -0.02
(0.010)** (0.016) (0.013)** (0.019)
Maximum years of education 0.036 0.022 0.035 0.019
(0.007)*** (0.011)** (0.008)*** (0.013)
Farm households (=1) -0.125 -0.136 -0.09 -0.146
(0.039)*** (0.067)** (0.041)** (0.074)**
Constant 10.14 12.01 10.057 9.287
(0.769)*** (1.275)*** (0.787)*** (1.810)***
p-values for null hypothesis that:
- IVs are valid (overi-dentification test) 0.515 0.577 0.867 0.471
- log (hh real income) is exogenous 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of households 3899 3899 3377 3377
Number of extended families 1723 1510
Number of extended families
with households in different communities 1124 985
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are proportion of hh members age 0-4,female hh head,
and non-farm household. Instrumental variables not included in the first stage regressions are: log of real value of land owned,
farm productive assets, and non-farm productive assets.
Appendix Table 5. Static Tests with 2SLS: First Stage, 2000 Extended Families with Multiple Households
and Parent-child Extended Families with Community Dummy Variables
Dependent variable: Extended families with Parent-child
log (household income) multiple households extended families
2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed 2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed
Fixed Effects Effects Fixed Effects Effects
log(household size) 1.513 1.601 1.471 1.279
(0.198)*** (0.286)*** (0.215)*** (0.316)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years -1.613 -1.338 -1.956 -1.435
(0.483)*** (0.614)** (0.528)*** (0.660)**
15-59 years, male 0.33 0.336 0.115 0.139
(0.493) (0.611) (0.525) (0.655)
15-59 years, female -0.119 -0.095 -0.419 -0.473
(0.515) (0.639) (0.553) (0.694)
60+ years, male -0.976 -0.635 -0.739 -0.826
(0.714) (0.821) (0.771) (0.896)
60+ years, female 0.238 1.238 0.22 0.999
(0.876) (0.993) (0.869) (1.080)
Male household head (=1) 1.33 1.382 1.217 1.181
(0.206)*** (0.274)*** (0.216)*** (0.298)***
Age of hh head 0.211 0.19 0.229 0.192
(0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)***
Age of hh head (squared) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Maximum years of education 0.121 0.093 0.113 0.099
(0.018)*** (0.031)*** (0.021)*** (0.033)***
Farm households (=1) -0.017 0.002 -0.177 -0.187
(0.206) (0.377) (0.194) (0.394)
Instrumental variables excluded from the second stage:
log (real value of land) 0.006 0.03 0.008 0.02
(0.009) (0.017)* (0.009) (0.018)
log(real value of farm assets) 0.033 0.023 0.031 0.043
(0.017)* (0.031) (0.016)* (0.032)
log(real value of nonfarm assets) 0.051 0.042 0.046 0.035
(0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.008)*** (0.013)***
F-test of exclusionary restrictions 17.36 5.74 12.28 3.88
(p-values) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.009
Number of households 3,899 3,899 3,377 3,377
Number of extended families 1,723 1,510
Number of extended families
with households in different communities 1,124 985
R-squared 0.57 0.71 0.58 0.74
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are proportion of hh members age 0-4,female hh head,
and non-farm household. Instrumental variables not included in the first stage regressions are: log of real value of land owned,
farm productive assets, and non-farm productive assets.
Appendix Table 6. Dynamic tests: 2000 Extended Families with Multiple Households
and Parent-Child Extended Families
Dependent variable: Extended families Parent-child
∆ log (household expenditure) with multiple households extended families
2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed 2SLS: No 2SLS: Fixed
Fixed Effects Effects Fixed Effects Effects
∆ log(household income) 0.017 0.02 0.019 0.019
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
∆ log(household size) 0.03 0.035 0.03 0.034
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
∆ proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 0.542 0.507 0.552 0.529
(0.036)*** (0.045)*** (0.039)*** (0.049)***
15-59 years, male 0.345 0.316 0.33 0.352
(0.086)*** (0.104)*** (0.091)*** (0.112)***
15-59 years, female 0.44 0.348 0.48 0.405
(0.088)*** (0.105)*** (0.093)*** (0.112)***
60+ years, male 0.404 0.321 0.442 0.377
(0.093)*** (0.111)*** (0.099)*** (0.120)***
60+ years, female -0.079 -0.127 -0.226 -0.129
-0.152 -0.163 (0.167) (0.178)
∆ Male household head (=1) 0.216 0.094 0.379 0.129
(0.130)* (0.145) (0.143)*** (.160)
∆ Age of hh head 0.103 0.102 0.128 0.123
(0.035)*** (0.044)** (0.037)*** (0.049)**
∆ Maximum years of education 0.083 0.18 0.075 0.162
(0.041)** (0.045)*** (0.044)* (0.048)***
∆ Farm households (=1) -0.018 -0.077 -0.01 -0.059
(0.025) (0.033)** (0.026) (0.036)
∆ log (median wage), male 0.038 0.069 0.04 0.078
(0.018)** (0.023)*** (0.020)** (0.025)***
∆ log (median wage), female 0.032 0.042 0.036 0.037
(0.012)*** (0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.018)**
∆ log (median prices of sugar) 0.23 0.117 0.176 -0.026
(0.075)*** (0.153) (0.082)** (0.168)
∆ log (median prices of oil) 0.319 0.351 0.344 0.302
(0.115)*** (0.276) (0.123)*** (0.302)
Constant -0.107 0.257 -0.072 0.14
(0.045)** (0.226) (0.049) (0.262)
Number of households 3899 3899 3377 3377
R-squared 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.26
Number of extended families 1723 1510
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are changes in proportion of hh members age 0-4,
female hh head, changes in the status of non-farm household.
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Appendix Table 11.:
Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own Household’s Consumption?
2SLS: Second Stage Regressions
Dependent variable: Extended families with Parent-child
log (household expenditure) multiple households extended families
log (hh’s income) 0.181 0.18
(0.027)*** (0.029)***
log (other hh’s income) 0.032 0.030
(0.031) (0.032)
Own hh’s variables
log(household size) 0.167 0.188
(0.061)*** (0.065)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 0.929 0.992
(0.282)*** (0.309)***
15-59 years, male 0.253 0.313
(0.219) (0.234)
15-59 years, female 0.765 0.781
(0.221)*** (0.245)***
60+ years, male 0.636 0.597
(0.348)* -0.407
60+ years, female 0.076 -0.047
(0.405) (0.461)
Male household head (=1) -0.131 -0.139
(0.065)** (0.070)**
Age of hh head -0.028 -0.031
(0.009)*** (0.010)***
Maximum years of education 0.038 0.037
(0.008)*** (0.009)***
Farm households (=1) -0.100 -0.081
(0.047)** (0.051)
log (median wage), male 0.046 0.049
(0.022)** (0.024)**
log (median wage), female 0.008 -0.002
(0.016) (0.017)
log (median prices of sugar) 0.012 0.172
(0.403) (0.434)
log (median prices of oil) 0.056 0.021
(0.307) (0.335)
Other hh’s variables
log(household size) 0.01 0.015
(0.021) (0.023)
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 0.061 0.069
(0.303) (0.325)
15-59 years, male 0.276 0.311
(0.226) (0.238)
15-59 years, female -0.275 -0.223
(0.230) (0.247)
60+ years, male 0.381 0.536
(0.430) (0.482)
60+ years, female 0.11 0.096
(0.372) (0.433)
(continued)
Appendix Table 11.:
Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own Household’s Consumption?
2SLS: Second Stage Regressions (Continued)
Dependent variable: Extended families Parent-child
log (household expenditure) with multiple households extended families
Other hh’s variables
Male household head (=1) -0.088 -0.081
(0.069) (0.071)
Age of hh head -0.01 -0.011
(0.011) (0.012)
Maximum years of education 0.013 0.014
(0.006)** (0.006)**
Farm households (=1) 0.021 0.018
(0.033) (0.035)
log (median wage), male 0.035 0.034
(0.024) (0.025)
log (median wage), female 0.009 0.021
(0.017) (0.018)
log (median prices of sugar) -0.099 -0.005
(0.171) (0.184)
log (median prices of oil) -0.271 -0.241
(0.235) (0.252)
Constant 12.653 10.639
(2.344)*** (2.532)***
p-value : significance of other hhs variables 61.61 (0.012) 59.18 (0.020)
p-values of null hypothesis that:
- IVs are valid (over-identification test) 0.039 0.052
- Own hh income exogenous 0.000 0.000
- Other hh income exogenous 0.221 0.258
Number of households 3899 3377
Number of extended families 1723 1510
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. Omitted variables are proportion of hh members age 0-4,female hh head,
and non-farm household. Variables included in the estimations but not reported on the table are province and urban dummy
variables and province-urban dummy interactions. Instrumental variables not included in the first stage regressions are:
log of real value of land owned, farm productive assets, and non-farm productive assets.
Appendix Table 12.:
Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own Household’s Consumption?
2SLS: First Stage Regressions
Extended families with Parent-child
multiple households extended families
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
log (own hh’s log (other hh’s log (own hh’s log (other hh’s
real income) real income) real income) real income)
Own hh’s variables
log(household size) 1.504 0.194 1.388 0.301
(0.191)*** (0.162) (0.208)*** (0.176)*
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years -2.599 4.263 -2.57 4.176
(0.984)*** (0.554)*** (1.092)** (0.635)***
15-59 years, male 0.52 4.718 0.615 4.782
(0.800) (0.452)*** (0.858) (0.509)***
15-59 years, female -1.485 4.25 -1.659 4.484
(0.907) (0.492)*** -1.013 (0.579)***
60+ years, male -1.021 3.214 -0.1 2.936
(1.888) (0.850)*** -2.058 (1.038)***
60+ years, female -2.191 1.327 -2.153 1.437
(1.971) (1.232) (1.890) (1.330)
Male household head (=1) 1.694 -0.273 1.667 -0.275
(0.185)*** (0.142)* (0.197)*** (0.162)*
Age of hh head 0.263 -0.001 0.285 -0.003
(0.027)*** (0.016) (0.029)*** (0.016)
Maximum years of education 0.081 -0.151 0.079 -0.142
(0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)***
Farm households (=1) -0.001 0.29 -0.298 0.489
(0.268) (0.235) (0.292) (0.282)*
log (median wage), male 0.218 -0.002 0.17 -0.004
(0.094)** (0.065) (0.106) (0.073)
log (median wage), female 0.128 0.007 0.167 0.008
(0.062)** (0.049) (0.067)** (0.053)
log (median prices of sugar) 1.177 -0.113 0.804 -0.92
(1.785) (1.464) (1.820) (1.709)
log (median prices of oil) -1.113 0.842 -1.504 1.447
(1.291) (1.095) (1.344) (1.214)
Other hh’s variables
log(household size) -0.091 0.156 -0.115 0.185
(0.077) (0.058)*** (0.085) (0.067)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years -0.296 -5.035 -0.58 -4.691
(1.068) (0.705)*** (1.183) (0.779)***
15-59 years, male -1.347 -5.167 -1.556 -5.114
(0.827) (0.419)*** (0.896)* (0.459)***
15-59 years, female 1.235 -4.912 1.189 -4.897
(0.917) (0.443)*** (1.015) (0.496)***
60+ years, male 1.233 -1.291 1.174 -1.105
(2.129) (1.475) (2.055) (1.617)
60+ years, female -0.333 -4.494 -0.854 -4.296
(1.999) (0.944)*** (2.149) (1.130)***
continued
Appendix Table 12.:
Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own Household’s Consumption?
2SLS: First Stage Regressions (continued)
Extended families with Parent-child
with multiple households extended families
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
log (own hh log (other hh log (own hh log (other hh
income) income) income) income)
Other hh’s variables
Male household head (=1) -0.087 1.842 -0.098 1.785
(0.134) (0.181)*** (0.143) (0.193)***
Age of hh head 0.009 0.298 0.008 0.311
(0.017) (0.027)*** (0.017) (0.030)***
Maximum years of education -0.009 0.131 -0.011 0.117
(0.015) (0.015)*** (0.016) (0.017)***
Farm households (=1) -0.095 -0.157 0.093 -0.198
(0.215) (0.141) (0.249) (0.157)
log (median wage), male -0.029 0.2 0.016 0.179
(0.082) (0.096)** (0.088) (0.107)*
log (median wage), female -0.046 0.067 -0.043 0.099
(0.062) (0.058) (0.065) (0.063)
log (median prices of sugar) 1.348 0.018 1.479 -0.18
(0.708)* (0.645) (0.750)** (0.705)
log (median prices of oil) -0.078 0.145 0.081 0.144
(1.045) (0.918) (1.090) (1.082)
IVs Excluded from 2nd Stage
log(own land) 0.014 -0.028 0.013 -0.028
(0.007)** (0.009)*** (0.007)* (0.011)***
log (own farm prod. assets) 0.032 0.007 0.036 -0.01
(0.014)** (0.018) (0.015)** (0.022)
log (own non-farm prod. assets) 0.063 0.0001 0.061 0.0001
(0.006)*** (0.007) (0.006)*** (0.008)
log (other’s land) -0.04 0.002 -0.039 0.001
(0.011)*** (0.007) (0.012)*** (0.008)
log (other’s farm prod. assets) 0.024 0.041 0.006 0.044
(0.020) (0.013)*** (0.022) (0.014)***
log (other’s non-farm prod. assets) 0.0001 0.054 0.003 0.056
(0.008) (0.005)*** (0.008) (0.006)***
Constant -10.523 -6.461 -7.146 -3.898
(9.133) (8.383) (9.920) (9.224)
F-test of identifying IVs (p-values)
Land and productive assets (own hh) 40.97 (0.000) 3.710 (0.011) 32.35 (0.000) 3.60 (0.013)
Land and productive assets (other hh) 4.72 (0.003) 41.62 (0.000) 4.15 (0.006) 35.43 (0.006)
Land and productive assets (own, other hh) 22.47(0.000) 22.22 (0.000) 18.07 (0.000) 19.00 (0.000)
Number of households 3899 3899 3377 3377
Number of extended families 1723 1723 1510 1510
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent,and * at 10 percent.
Appendix Table 13.:
Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own household’s Consumption?
Reduced Form Regressions
Dependent variable: OLS: Extended families OLS: Parent-child
log (household expenditure) with multiple households extended families
Own hh’s variables
log(household size) 0.447 0.448
(0.034)*** (0.037)***
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years 0.563 0.615
(0.182)*** (0.196)***
15-59 years, male 0.475 0.548
(0.134)*** (0.149)***
15-59 years, female 0.612 0.598
(0.134)*** (0.143)***
60+ years, male 0.542 0.657
(0.280)* (0.341)*
60+ years, female -0.318 -0.443
(0.301) (0.318)
Male household head (=1) 0.162 0.149
(0.031)*** (0.034)***
Age of hh head 0.02 0.021
(0.004)*** (0.004)***
Maximum years of education 0.048 0.047
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
Farm households (=1) -0.081 -0.092
(0.062) (0.066)
log (median wage), male 0.087 0.081
(0.018)*** (0.019)***
log (median wage), female 0.032 0.03
(0.012)*** (0.013)**
log (median prices of sugar) 0.182 0.242
(0.312) (0.343)
log (median prices of oil) -0.084 -0.168
(0.233) (0.251)
log(own land) x 10−2 0.318 0.274
(0.211) (0.002)
log (own farm prod. assets) x 10−2 0.611 0.669
(0.424) (0.004)
log (own non-farm prod. assets) x 10−2 1.328 1.296
(0.154)*** (0.166)***
Other hh’s variables
log(household size) -0.003 -0.002
-0.016 -0.017
Proportion of hh members:
6-14 years -0.118 -0.134
(0.195) (0.210)
15-59 years, male -0.099 -0.092
(0.129) (0.144)
15-59 years, female -0.181 -0.128
(0.126) (0.133)
60+ years, male 0.632 0.796
(0.330)* (0.352)**
60+ years, female -0.085 -0.178
(0.293) (0.359)
(continued)
Appendix Table 13.:
Do Other Households’ Resources Affect Own Household’s Consumption?
Reduced Form Regressions (continued)
Dependent variable: OLS: Extended families OLS: Parent-child
log (household expenditure) with multiple households extended families
Other hh’s variables
Male household head (=1) -0.043 -0.044
(0.027) (0.029)
Age of hh head 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Maximum years of education 0.015 0.014
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
Farm households (=1) -0.026 -0.021
(0.038) (0.041)
log (median wage), male 0.039 0.044
(0.017)** (0.019)**
log (median wage), female 0.006 0.019
(0.013) (0.014)
log (median prices of sugar) 0.135 0.251
(0.125) (0.131)*
log (median prices of oil) -0.253 -0.188
(0.182) (0.200)
log (other’s land) x 10−2 0.099 0.126
(0.189) (0.207)
log (other’s farm prod. assets) x 10−2 0.16 0.077
(0.309) (0.339)
log (other’s non-farm prod. assets) x 10−2 0.19 0.211
(0.144) (0.157)
F-test
Land and prod. assets (own) 28.36 (0.000) 22.80 (0.000)
Land and prod. assets (other) 0.96 (0.409) 0.86 ( 0.462)
All own hh’s variables 27.01 (0.000) 22.99 (0.000)
All other hh’s variables 2.09 (0.001) 2.02 (0.0001)
Constant 10.417 9.04
(1.860)*** (1.985)***
Number of households 3899 3377
Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. *** indicates statistical significance
at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.
